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Afghanistan’s Lessons: Part I

NATO’s Lessons
Seth A. Johnston
©2019 Seth A. Johnston

ABSTRACT: This article identifies the importance of NATO’s
role as a facilitator of multinational collaboration. The Alliance’s
established processes and standards worked well, enabling
countries whose available resources might otherwise prohibit their
participation to fully-contribute to the mission in Afghanistan.

T

oday’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization is no Cold War alliance.
Few developments illustrate NATO’s capacity for adaptation
more than its 21st century role in Afghanistan.1 NATO allies
invoked the collective defense provision—Article 5—of its founding
treaty for the first and only time just one day after the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks.2 Few present at the signing of the North Atlantic
Treaty in 1949 could have imagined it would be invoked by European
countries and Canada seeking to support the United States or that the
Alliance’s largest and longest military operation would occur in central
Asia. Fewer still might have predicted NATO allies would agree to the
mission so soon after the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, a crisis the then
US ambassador to NATO described as a “near death experience” for
the Alliance.3 Yet NATO assumed control of the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2003 and has remained in Afghanistan for the
better part of two decades.
As the United States has begun negotiating a political settlement
to the Afghanistan conflict with a view to the eventual withdrawal
of international forces there, an assessment from the overall NATO
perspective will complement the national initiatives.4 This effort will
also support ongoing efforts to reassess NATO’s priorities in the face of
other security challenges.5

1      Seth A. Johnston, How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance since 1950
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017), 1–15, 40–42.
2      The September 12, 2001 decision was contingent on evidence that the attacks originated
from a foreign source. When US officials confirmed this condition to the North Atlantic Council
early in October 2001, invocation of Article 5 became official. “Statement by the North Atlantic
Council,” Press Release (2001) 124, NATO, September 12, 2001; and George Robertson, “Statement
by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson,” NATO, October 2, 2001.
3      R. Nicholas Burns, “NATO Has Adapted: An Alliance with a New Mission,” New York Times,
May 24, 2003.
4      Afghanistan: Lessons Learned (conference, University of St. Andrews, Fife, Scotland,
February 11–13, 2019).
5      For a recent official summary of NATO’s agenda on current challenges, see “Brussels Summit
Declaration,” Press Release (2018) 074, NATO, July 11, 2018.
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Although NATO has undertaken formal studies of its activities in
Afghanistan, recent scholarship by Heidi Hardt, Jörg Noll, and Sebastiaan
Rietjens cast doubt on the efficacy of formal lessons learned processes
in international organizations generally and in NATO specifically.6 This
article offers an external and an unofficial assessment of the Alliance’s
efforts and provides initial suppositions. In sum, NATO’s impact in
Afghanistan may not have been enough to mitigate national shortcomings
or to achieve victory on its own, but it was significant and positive. The
Alliance’s adaptability and highly institutionalized character are at the
root of these contributions.
Moreover, the mission in Afghanistan affected NATO in ways that
promoted allied political cohesion, organizational effectiveness, and
military interoperability. The chief implications of these findings are
that while national political leadership and strategy formulation remain
paramount in war, NATO remains a proven and effective instrument
of organizing and implementing coordinated multinational efforts.
The most important lesson learned from NATO in Afghanistan may
therefore be about NATO’s more general value to the United States and
other members.

NATO: Alliance and International Organization

In contrast to national assessments, this analysis focuses on the
formal institutions of the Alliance. NATO is unique among alliances in
that it is not only a treaty-based agreement among member states, but
also an international organization—and a highly institutionalized one at
that. Since its early years, NATO has been comprised of a permanently
staffed formal political headquarters supported by a network of military
and civilian organizations. Particularly noteworthy is NATO’s integrated
joint multinational military structure, a unique innovation without
equivalent among other alliances or international organizations.
This integration, capped by the Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Belgium, extends through various echelons
and included the ISAF headquarters and other NATO structures in
Afghanistan.7 Thus, for this article, “NATO” refers to the various
formal institutions and not the group of allied countries. Likewise,
the focus is on the collaborative conduct and not that of the United
States, other allies or partners, the government of Afghanistan, or other
regional actors. Nor does the article address the efficacy of counterinsurgency warfare.
International relations theory would emphasize the formal
institutions of NATO have very weak independent power and agency.
6      Heidi Hardt, NATO’s Lessons in Crisis: Institutional Memory in International Organizations (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2018); Jörg Noll and Sebastiaan Rietjens, “Learning the Hard Way:
NATO’s Civil-Military Cooperation,” in Theorising NATO: New Perspectives on the Atlantic Alliance, ed.
Mark Webber and Adrian Hyde-Price (New York: Routledge, 2016).
7      NATO’s integrated military command structure technically boasts two strategic commands of
officially equivalent status: Allied Command Transformation, based in Norfolk, Virginia, and Allied
Command Operations at SHAPE.
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But although NATO consists of such formal institutions, the Alliance
remains an alliance among states. All decisions at NATO Headquarters
are taken by consensus among member states (which will soon number
30). Politics among those countries happens, and the relative influence
of individual member states is closely associated with their power.
NATO’s institutions matter chiefly because of how they facilitate and
structure the relations among the states. Like any other international
organization, states may derive value from such institutions because they
provide benefits such as establishing predictable structures and routines
for decision-making; increasing information sharing; improving
efficiency and reducing transaction costs; and defining roles, status, and
identity. The most important questions for NATO in the context of
assessing its role in the Afghanistan conflict is whether and how well it
has performed these functions.
An important theme in the assessment of NATO’s role in Afghanistan regards the reciprocal impact of the Alliance and Afghanistan,
as Alexander Mattelaer and others have noted.8 Thus, one kind of
lesson relates to NATO’s effect on the mission and the implications
for future coalition expeditionary warfare; another, the future of the
transatlantic Alliance.

NATO and Strategy in Afghanistan

The causes of NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan appear logical:
an international terrorist group based in Afghanistan attacked the United
States. Citing the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO allies declared the attack
on the United States as an attack on all allies. The participation of allied
countries or the whole-of-NATO in a US-led response in Afghanistan
seemed straightforward. How NATO became involved in Afghanistan
was in fact murkier. The United States initially preferred not to involve
established alliances after 9/11. As then US Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld memorably explained, “The mission determines the coalition,
and the coalition must not determine the mission.”9 When the United
Nations authorized the ISAF in 2001, with a limited functional and
geographic mandate around Kabul, the lead countries of the ISAF
coincidentally tended to be members of NATO.
In planning for an ISAF rotation in 2003, the lead nations realized
they could achieve some capability enhancements and cost savings by
applying NATO resources. Still struggling meaningfully to demonstrate
the consequences of its post-9/11 invocation of Article 5 and searching
for a way to reconcile allies divided over the Iraq War, NATO saw an
opportunity: supporting or participating in the Afghanistan campaign
could reinvigorate the Alliance; encourage rapprochement between the
United States and those (mostly western European) allies opposed to
8      Alexander Mattelaer, “How Afghanistan Has Strengthened NATO,” Survival 53, no. 6
(December 2011–January 2012): 127–40; and senior NATO official 2, interview by the author,
February 8, 2019.
9      Donald Rumsfeld, “Text: Rumsfeld’s Pentagon News Conference,” Washington Post, October
18, 2001.
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the Iraq War; and offer others (mostly newer eastern European allies,
NATO aspirants, and global partners) an occasion to cultivate even
more positive relations with the United States and NATO.10
For its part, the United States warmed to the idea of greater allied
involvement in Afghanistan as the cost of the Iraq War increased. For
the allied institution, therefore, the initial entry into Afghanistan had
broad politico-diplomatic benefits for transatlantic relations as well as
some small practical advantages for some countries. But it occurred
without much clear debate or unified strategic ends in Afghanistan.
Tellingly, the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s top political decisionmaking body, did not issue an “initiating directive” with guidance for
the development of military plans for Afghanistan. This decision may
be understandable insofar as NATO deferred thinking about those ends
to the United States, and the UN authorization of ISAF, which NATO
was taking over. But Afghanistan itself may have been a secondary
concern. Evidence suggests at least some NATO countries explicitly
expressed reservations about the purpose of the Alliance’s involvement
in Afghanistan but supported it anyway.11
Such early inattention to strategy in Afghanistan caused at least
two major problems. The first concerned time. As the years passed,
NATO was drawn incrementally further into the conflict and the lack
of clear and agreed strategic ends at the institutional level became
increasingly troublesome. Expanding the ISAF from an organization
with a predominantly noncombat and geographically limited mandate
around Kabul to one responsible for conducting a full range of military
operations throughout Afghanistan by the end of 2006 elevated the
prominence of this issue. The confusion over NATO’s strategic ends
became most apparent in southern Afghanistan where the insurgency
raged but different ISAF countries acted almost autonomously within
their respective areas of responsibility, with greatly varying priorities
in counterterrorism, local security, development, security force and
governance assistance, counternarcotics, and other aspects of the
counterinsurgency approach that had gained currency in US military
circles by this time but were not widely shared among NATO allies.12
Short tour lengths and frequent changes in commanders compounded

10      Afghanistan: Lessons Learned; Ryan C. Hendrickson, Diplomacy and War at NATO: The
Secretary General and Military Action after the Cold War (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2006),
120; and Seth A. Johnston, No Longer Obsolete: How NATO Endures in the Twenty-First Century (West
Point, NY: Modern War Institute, 2017), 14–17.
11      Judy Dempsey, “France Bars Moves for Greater Alliance Role,” Financial Times, February
10, 2003.
12      Benjamin Schreer, “The Evolution of NATO’s Strategy in Afghanistan,” in Pursuing Strategy:
NATO Operations from the Gulf War to Gaddafi, ed. Håkan Edström and Dennis Gyllensporre
(Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 144–45.
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these problems, as new personnel naturally applied their own priorities
and interpretations of strategic ends.13
NATO had embarked on a security assistance mission but ended up
in a war without much discussion of war aims. The Alliance ultimately
confronted this problem and, by 2008, had achieved consensus on a
clear and detailed strategy.14 But this occurred five years after NATO’s
initial involvement in Afghanistan and seven years into the conflict. The
duration of the war was becoming a significant political concern by this
point, and following the entrance of a new US presidential administration
in 2009, the United States soon adopted a new strategy that called for
large troop increases and a goal of starting troop withdrawals by 2011.15
The international mission was thereafter extended only incrementally
two or three years at a time, reflecting tension between the domestic
political reality among allies and the ambition of the strategy and its
counterinsurgency approach.
The second, related problem with NATO strategic ends concerned
their suitability in Afghanistan. The agreed strategic goals depended
on the creation of effective and sustainable Afghan government and
security institutions. The 2009 Afghan presidential election debacle
underscored the difficulty of such a goal. ISAF commander General
Stanley McChrystal rightly recognized this difficulty in describing
the capability of the Afghan government and the Taliban as obstacles
to victory.16
Proponents of counterinsurgency in general may conclude the
Afghan government’s troubles in this case were so great that a strategy
may have required resources beyond what NATO and ISAF member
countries would be able to give. Those more skeptical about the general
efficacy of counterinsurgency may conclude Afghanistan is yet another
case demonstrating the inherent limitations of foreign powers to reshape
other nations. Either way, the lesson for NATO’s strategic ends recalls
the idea from Carl von Clausewitz that policy ought not ask of strategy
that which its chosen means cannot deliver.17 Admittedly, this question
may be less about NATO specifically and more about counterinsurgency
and other such missions in general. Yet this question has resonance not
only because of Afghanistan but also because of the demand for NATO
13      Theo Farrell and Sten Rynning, “NATO’s Transformation Gaps: Transatlantic Differences
and the War in Afghanistan,” Journal of Strategic Studies 33, no. 5 (October 2010): 673–99; and Stephen
M. Saideman and David P. Auerswald, “Comparing Caveats: Understanding the Sources of National
Restrictions upon NATO’s Mission in Afghanistan,” International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 1 (March
2012): 67–84.
14      The confidential Comprehensive Strategic Political-Military Plan was announced publicly at the
2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest. “ISAF’s Strategic Vision,” Press Release (2008) 052, NATO,
April 3, 2008.
15      Barack H. Obama, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward
in Afghanistan and Pakistan” (speech, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, December
1, 2009).
16      Stanley McChrystal, Commander’s Initial Assessment (Kabul, Afghanistan: International Security
Assistance Force, August 30, 2009).
17      Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1976), 87.
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involvement in similar situations. In Kosovo, for example, the Alliance
has maintained a peacekeeping force and imperfect relationship with
local government for 20 years after the 1999 intervention. Allied countries
also grapple with such questions and the prospect of similar calls arising
from elsewhere. Thus, the Alliance has a stake in the debate.18
A ready critique of the conflict in Afghanistan is that resources
were either too small or too slowly applied to bring about the desired
strategic ends. This critique might point out NATO’s original 2003
involvement in the ISAF was motivated by short-term cost savings on
the part of a few allies; the expansion of ISAF under NATO leadership
was a tacit acknowledgment that the United States chose to economize
its commitments in Afghanistan as an effort to address the concurrent
deteriorating situation in Iraq; and the buildup of US forces in 2009–10
may have been too little, too late—unpersuasive to a Taliban adversary
that viewed the time-limited withdrawal intentions as its own plausible
path to victory. But this critique of means has less to do with NATO
than with the impracticality of matching means to uncertain ends,
as described above. Moreover, the provision of means to any allied
initiative or strategy depends less on the Alliance and more on the will
of participating countries. National responsibility for resources is the
essence of the burden-sharing issue not just for Afghanistan but for all
NATO activities.
The Alliance’s main role in resourcing a strategy is therefore to
clarify and organize what countries provide. NATO deserves credit for
its positive contributions in this respect. The Alliance’s overarching
NATO defense planning process (NDPP) and the mission-specific
combined joint statement of requirements (CJSOR) for Afghanistan
are well-organized processes for identifying and communicating
requirements as well as integrating resources provided.19 Even when
nations did not always fully resource every requirement in the CJSOR,
which was usually the case, the process helped serve as an assessment
tool and benchmark for intra-alliance politics and negotiations.20 The
United States, for example, has used information from the CJSOR to
tailor specific requests to other countries in bilateral diplomacy with a
view to filling out the comprehensive statement of means. Moreover,
NATO offered common doctrine, standards, and even some training to
facilitate interoperability for allies and nonmember partners participating
in the coalition. This architecture facilitated the integration of forces

18      Official 2, interview. As in Afghanistan, local actors in Kosovo have frustrated NATO
efforts to achieve its strategic goals for lasting peace and stability. Kosovo’s assertion of national
independence through its intention to create an army has enflamed relations with Serbia and
occurred despite NATO’s protest, to cite a recent example.
19      “NATO Defence Planning Process,” NATO, June 28, 2018; and NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine
for the Planning of Operations, Allied joint publication (AJP)-5 (Brussels: NATO Standardization
Agency, 2013).
20      John R. Deni, “Perfectly Flawed? The Evolution of NATO’s Force Generation Process,”
in NATO’s Post-Cold War Politics: The Changing Provision of Security, ed. Sebastian Mayer, (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 176–93.
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and capabilities from the more than 40 countries that participated in the
NATO-led mission in Afghanistan.21
The effect of the mission on the Alliance is a more positive story in
several respects. First is the durable commitment of NATO and its allies
to the campaign, which includes remaining in Afghanistan as long as the
United States does. Non-US members of the coalition have suffered more
than 1,000 combat fatalities, spent billions of dollars, and maintained this
commitment for more than 15 years.22 This commitment is even more
remarkable given the domestic political unpopularity of the conflict in
many of the participating countries and the absence of a direct interest
in Afghanistan for most of them. As one senior European official said
to a group of Americans at a recent meeting of the NATO Military
Committee, “My country had no direct security interest in going to
Afghanistan. We did it for you [the United States].”23 The maintenance
of the allied cohesion on involvement in Afghanistan thus benefited
the United States. It also says something larger about the convening
and staying power of NATO in general. The allies’ commitment to an
unpopular conflict that was at best tied only indirectly to most countries’
security interests is an indicator of the importance states attach to the
Alliance in general.24
Notwithstanding conclusions about the quality of the strategy
for the Afghanistan conflict, NATO played a positive and useful role
in offering a structured forum for the strategy-making process. The
Alliance demonstrated the potential for aggregating this process—
always complex and difficult, even for one nation—among all the allies
and partners in the coalition. The institutions, including the various
committees at NATO headquarters, as well as higher-level foreign and
defense ministers meetings and summits, provided both a structure
for deliberation and routine political accountability.25 This structure
facilitated the articulation of strategic ends as well as the iterative process
of matching ways and means to those ends.
Compared to ad hoc multinational coalitions, the NATO structure
encourages political cohesion and staying power because nations have
a mechanism for their interests and concerns to be heard on a political
as well as a military level.26 Compare, for example, the NATO effort
in Afghanistan with the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS (Islamic State
in Iraq and Syria): all NATO allies and the institution are members of
the coalition devised during the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales. And
the military forces of the coalition are interoperable, to a great degree,
21      Official 2, interview. For an archival list of contributing countries to the NATO mission
see “Meetings of NATO Ministers of Defence: Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and
Figures Placemat,” NATO, June 25, 2019.
22      Douglas Lute and Nicholas Burns, NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis (Cambridge, MA:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2019), 2.
23      NATO Military Committee meeting, Washington, DC, March 14, 2019.
24      Afghanistan: Lessons Learned.
25      Nicholas Burns et al., “NATO’s Leadership Crisis” (seminar, Harvard Kennedy School,
Cambridge, MA, September 18, 2018).
26      Official 2, interview.
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because of the members’ common NATO experiences. But there is no
inherent mechanism for political consultation among the coalition’s
members. Arrangement of coalition meetings thus fell to the United
States and other countries on a multilateral basis. A significant part of
the rationale for NATO institutions joining the coalition was so the
Alliance could host or convene meetings of the coalition, again often on
the sidelines of a NATO-only meeting.27
The Alliance extended this deliberative structure to include the
participating nonmember partners in the Afghanistan mission.28 The
increased prominence of the office of an ambassador-level NATO
senior civilian representative in Afghanistan after 2010 further
institutionalized this political coordination. These derivative benefits
of NATO’s partnership program and longstanding tradition of civilian
engagement and political dialog facilitated multinational contributions
to the mission in Afghanistan. Even with the elusiveness of victory and
the marginal significance of Afghanistan in the direct national security
interests of coalition members, the longstanding commitment of allies
to the NATO mission in Afghanistan reflects positively on the perceived
value of the Alliance.

Organizing for Afghanistan

An advantage of NATO has been its role as a forum for coordinating
decision-making and action among allies. Results depend mostly on
what allies decide and do. But NATO institutions can assist countries
in collective decisions and facilitate implementation. Though NATO’s
role in offering a process for strategy-making in Afghanistan has been
positive, aspects of organization and implementation in the Afghanistan
conflict, particularly in the military area, deserve closer examination.
Command authority is one such issue. The political reality of
coalition warfare necessarily complicates military authority and gave
rise to several challenges in Afghanistan. One prominent challenge
concerned the caveats imposed by most troop contributing nations
on the employment of their forces. Some limitations affected material
capabilities, such as the range of vehicles or equipment to operate at
night. Legal or political considerations, such as rules of engagement or
the taking and treatment of prisoners also played a role. Many of these
restrictions stemmed from the lack of consensus on strategy, especially
during the first years of NATO involvement. National caveats, especially
the previously unstated or those not specified in advance, were some of
the clearest consequences of strategic differences and frustrated NATO
27      Official 1, interview by the author, May 22, 2019; and “Meeting of the Ministers of the
Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS” (US Department of State, Washington, DC, February 6, 2019).
28      The inclusion of non-NATO contributing partners in political deliberations at NATO
Headquarters was not immediate. Australia, one of the larger non-NATO participants in the
Afghanistan mission, made a particular point of advocating for the opening these discussions to
partner nations. The effect of this effort has been significant, as nonmember partners are now
routinely included in relevant NATO deliberations and information on a range of allied initiatives.
Afghanistan: Lessons Learned.
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commanders in the field.29 Successful commanders made the most of
the available resources, of course, but the caveats increased the burdens
for planning staff, reduced commanders’ flexibility, and negatively
affected camaraderie and perceptions of fairness among the troops.30
Yet they were the price of broad international participation and political
cohesion. Stronger political agreement and strategic clarity may reduce
the salience of caveats. But risk discouraged broad participation. Similar
trade-offs will continue in Afghanistan and in future missions.
Another problem involved overlapping authorities. “Dual-hatting”
is a common practice in NATO that can produce neutral if not positive
effects. A prominent example is the role of Supreme Allied Commander
Europe (SACEUR), who is customarily an American who also commands
the US European Command. Although this officer must split time
between the two responsibilities, each headquarters has its own staff and
the authorities of each office tend to reinforce the other. The SACEUR
can prioritize and lead NATO military efforts to reinforce US initiatives,
and vice versa.
In Afghanistan, however, the greater number and types of hats
placed on senior leaders did not always produce reinforcing effects. To
take one example from the air domain, a single US Air Force general
officer toward the end of the ISAF mission in 2014 was wearing at least
five hats representing various command and staff duties in both national
and multinational NATO contexts.31 Particularly when roles did not
come with additional resources, such as the dual-hatting of entire staffs
or organizations, the unavoidable practical effect was prioritizing some
roles and inattention to others. This challenge especially affected US
servicemembers who were relatively less familiar or experienced in
NATO doctrine and standards compared to their counterparts from
other countries in the Alliance.32
A compounding factor in Afghanistan was the relatively distinct
missions of the NATO-led ISAF and the US-led Operation Enduring
Freedom, with the latter placing greater emphasis on counterterrorism.33
The United States largely tolerated the separation between NATO and
US missions until the approach approved by President Barack Obama
in 2009 enabled General Stanley McChrystal to enforce a degree of
29      Official 1, interview; and Saideman and Auerswald, “Comparing Caveats,” 67–84.
30      Official 4, correspondence with the author, February 9, 2019.
31      Kenneth S. Wilsbach and David J. Lyle, “NATO Air Command-Afghanistan: The Continuing
Evolution of Airpower Command and Control,” Air & Space Power Journal 28, no. 1 (January–
February 2014): 12.
32      In the words of one (American) NATO commander, “The NATO country whose troops
understand NATO the least is the United States.” This difference in familiarity with NATO
practices is an understandable consequence of the global nature of US military commitments; US
servicemembers are more likely to serve in Asia or other non-NATO environments. But insofar as
the learning curve for NATO leadership was steep compared with other national roles, the incentives
to “go with what you know” did not favor the prioritization of NATO responsibilities for US leaders
dual-hatted in NATO positions. Official 3, interview by author, June 6, 2018.
33      This distinction remains an issue in Afghanistan today as the NATO-led Resolute Support
is a noncombat “train, advise, assist” mission while that of US Forces-Afghanistan has broader
authorities. Many Resolute Support and US Forces-Afghanistan key leaders are dual-hatted.
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previously unseen integration. This change was due in no small measure
to McChrystal’s credibility within the US special operations community
as well as his understanding of the NATO mission and counterinsurgency
approach.34 But however commendable this integration was, one of the
leading methods for achieving it was through dual-hatting.
The Alliance’s organization and chain of command outside the
theater further frustrated NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan.35 Formally,
the chain of command ran from the commander of the ISAF through
the Netherlands headquarters of NATO Allied Joint Force Command
Brunssum (JFCBS) and then to SHAPE and SACEUR. Yet the
commander of JFCBS had little practical authority and headquarters
was not resourced to provide much support to the Afghan theater.
By subordinating ISAF to an operational-level JFC headquarters, the
NATO chain of command implied ISAF was tactical, a classification that
made little sense even before the creation of the ISAF Joint Command
in 2009 expressly facilitated the higher ISAF Headquarters’ focus on
operational and strategic matters.36 Moreover, four-star US commanders
in Afghanistan reported in their national capacity to the commander US
Central Command, who could provide significant enabling resources
and was a peer to the US European Command commander, the
SACEUR. Bypassing JFCBS in the NATO chain of command may
have seemed sensible or appropriate from a nationally oriented resource
and protocol point of view, but the practice reflected negatively on the
NATO command structure.37
One non-US member of the NATO military structure who had a
prominent supporting role for the Afghanistan mission was the Deputy
Supreme Allied Commander (DSACEUR), customarily a British officer.
The principal role for DSACEUR involved force generation, and
specifically management of the CJSOR process, which to some extent,
reflected the importance of the process to NATO’s overall contribution to strategy in Afghanistan being procedural rather than
substantive. But this trend may have created unintended consequences
for the future capability or readiness of the DSACEUR office actually
to command, as envisaged for example in the case of a European
Union mission using NATO resources as agreed under the Berlin Plus
agreement or successor arrangements.38
Another component of NATO organization relevant to Afghanistan
concerned training, doctrine, and lessons learned. Allied Command
Transformation (ACT) plays a large role in the NATO exercise program
34      Official 1, interview. This distinction between US and NATO mission roles has reemerged
since the end of ISAF and launch of the expressly noncombat NATO Resolute Support Mission
after 2014.
35      Sten Rynning, “ISAF and NATO: Campaign Innovation and Organizational Adaptation,”
in Military Adaptation in Afghanistan ed. Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga, and James A. Russell (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 2013).
36      Schreer, “Evolution of NATO’s Strategy,” in Edström and Gyllensporre, Pursuing
Strategy, 140.
37      Official 4, correspondence.
38      “Washington Summit Communiqué,” Press Release NAC-S(99)64, NATO, April 24, 1999.
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and maintains training institutions such as the Joint Warfare Centre in
Stavanger, Norway, and the Joint Force Training Centre in Bydgoszcz,
Poland. In theory, these resources can and do prepare allied forces. In
practice, training is predominantly a national responsibility, and national
commitment to NATO standards is often a more important factor in
determining the readiness and interoperability of forces.
NATO established a Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre
(JALLC) in Monsanto, Portugal, under the auspices of ACT in 2002.
Originally intended to assess NATO exercises, the JALLC adapted to
take stock of real operational lessons learned from Afghanistan and
other places. But, as with training, the real impact of the lessons depends
largely on national priorities.39 Finally, formal changes to NATO
doctrine and standards is often slow. The first edition of its doctrine
for counterinsurgency, for example, Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.4.4,
was not published until 2011, years after NATO had adopted such an
approach in Afghanistan.40
A final critique of NATO composition concerns the complexity of
relationships with non-NATO organizations in Afghanistan. In the efforts
to develop the Afghan government and its security forces, for example,
allied and coalition organizations included the ISAF mission broadly, the
NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan, the US-led Combined Security
Transition Command–Afghanistan, the provincial reconstruction
teams, and bespoke organizations such as the anticorruption Combined
Joint Interagency Task Force Shafafiyat. Coordination with other nonNATO actors in the environment such as the UN Assistance Mission
in Afghanistan, nongovernmental organizations, third countries (such
as Iran, Pakistan, India, China, and Russia), and above all, the Afghan
government compounded the complexity.
The current NATO Resolute Support Mission focus on “train, advise,
assist” is less ambitious and less complex, but also more reliant on the
actions of non-NATO entities to achieve its goals. NATO acknowledged
as much by greatly increasing its emphasis on external partnerships in
its 2010 Strategic Concept, which was promulgated concurrent to that
year’s Lisbon Summit decision to terminate the ISAF combat mission by
2014. NATO reaffirmed this emphasis through the establishment of the
aforementioned office of the NATO Senior Civilian Representative and
by the unprecedented step of inviting the governments of Afghanistan
and ISAF countries to participate in its 2012 summit deliberations and
declarations on Afghanistan in Chicago.

39      Tom Dyson, Organisational Learning and the Modern Army: A New Model for Lessons-Learned
Processes (New York: Routledge, 2019); and Hardt, NATO’s Lessons in Crisis.
40      NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN), AJP-3.4.4 (Brussels: NATO
Standardization Agency, February 4, 2011); and NATO, “Allied Joint Doctrine for CounterInsurgency (COIN),” NATO Standardization Agreement 2611 (Brussels: NATO Standardization
Agency, February 4, 2011).
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Field Support Services

Some of the most significant developments of NATO’s involvement
in the Afghanistan conflict have been in the lesser-known areas of
support and sustainment services. Logistics may be the most notable of
these developments, particularly given the challenges of Afghanistan’s
rough and landlocked topography and the remoteness of central Asia
from NATO’s traditional geographic area. According to the principle of
“costs lie where they fall,” transportation and sustainment in NATO is a
national responsibility. But few NATO nations possessed the capability
to transport their forces to Afghanistan and to supply them once there.
Yet NATO troops in Afghanistan have rarely suffered for want of fuel,
ammunition, spare parts, food, water, or other supplies in Afghanistan.
Successful diplomacy deserves credit for keeping supply lines open
through neighboring countries that have not always had smooth relations
with NATO and the mission in Afghanistan, including Pakistan and
Russia. NATO’s role in the allocation of common logistic services in
Afghanistan is one of the clearest examples of how the Alliance can
facilitate multinational cooperation.
Particularly for countries with a light footprint in Afghanistan, the
burden of establishing independent supply chains for a small national
contingent may be prohibitive. But the ability to access a common
logistics system relieves those concerns by lowering costs and increasing
the potential for broad international participation. Benefits existed for
larger countries as well. American and British logistics systems at the
beginning of the conflict were, for example, initially incompatible with
NATO systems but later reconciled.41
In 2009, the United States decided to rely on a NATO platform
for fuel acquisition and distribution in Afghanistan, expanding access
from large installations to forward operating bases. This measure
increased both the amount of fuel delivered and the flexible capacity
to sustain other allies and partners in those locations.42 The key NATO
institution for organizing many of these logistic services is the NATO
Support and Procurement Agency, which had its origins in Cold War
era supply organizations but was reorganized in 2010 with a clearer
focus on support to operations like Afghanistan. Notwithstanding the
direct success of these efforts to keep NATO forces supplied, negative
consequences included the distorting effect of foreign money and goods

41      Heidi Reisinger, Not only “Containerspotting”—NATO’s Redeployment from Landlocked Afghanistan,
NATO Defense College Research Paper No. 98 (Rome, Italy: NATO Defense College October
2013), 4.
42      Logistics and fuel in particular offered ample opportunity for fraud and corruption in
Afghanistan. Official 1, interview; and Michael J. Evans and Stephen W. Masternak, “The Silent
Revolution within NATO Logistics: A Study in Afghanistan Fuel and Future Applications” (master’s
thesis, US Naval Postgraduate School, December 2012), 120.
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on the Afghan economy and the attendant potential for crime and
corruption—a problem hardly unique to NATO.43
Intelligence is another example of the potential for NATO to offer
a process for multinational cooperation that also depends on national
participation. NATO offered a system and the standards for classifying
intelligence at the institutional and ISAF mission levels as well as an
architecture for sharing that intelligence. The mixed results of this
effort in Afghanistan likely occurred because the quality of such allied
intelligence depends largely on input from each nation. Countries were
usually willing to share low-level information related to force protection,
but tended to guard higher-level intelligence and information that might
reveal capabilities, sources, or methods. This reluctance is inherent in
multinational environments, and there are often trade-offs between the
number of countries participating in a mission and the willingness of
those countries to share intelligence with the entire group.44
NATO and ISAF experimented with several different models for
facilitating intelligence sharing given these constraints. Models that
were more likely to result in sharing involved a NATO or ISAF hub
with spokes to national intelligence cells that shared what they could.
The more common model of intelligence organization was housing
the institution’s intelligence function within a national structure. The
latter model prevails at the highest echelons of the NATO mission in
Afghanistan, where the NATO intelligence staff is dual-hatted with that
of US Forces-Afghanistan.45
Another lesson from Afghanistan involved communications, which
further exemplifies some of the challenges identified above, including
unity of command and intelligence sharing. Throughout the conflict
in Afghanistan, headquarters personnel often monitored more than
four communications and information technology systems representing
various coalition groupings, classifications, and technical capabilities.
This fragmented information environment was inefficient and taxed
users, even though it created a redundancy that guaranteed a working
communications channel. Early in the coalition expansion effort, NATO
realized a single, secure network for missions would be necessary for
NATO and non-NATO partners. Fielding of the network demonstrated
NATO’s capability as a process facilitator.
43      Furthermore, much of the NATO logistics work was contracted to private companies
which were largely responsible for their own security. The profusion of armed private contractors
was yet another challenge to unity of command and created at least the potential for violence or
destabilizing effects that worked at cross purposes to NATO’s overarching campaign objectives. See
Elke Krahmann, “NATO Contracting in Afghanistan: the Problem of Principal-Agent Networks,”
International Affairs 92, no. 6 (2016): 1401–26.
44      James Igoe Walsh, The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2009); Helge Arnli, “Intelligence Sharing with Host Nations in Multinational
Operations: Hurdles and Dilemmas in Afghanistan” (master’s thesis, Norwegian Defense Command
and Staff College, Spring 2010); and James L. Mader, “Diplomat Soldiers: A Study of Military
Counterintelligence Cooperation in NATO, 1951–1960” (dissertation, University of Utrecht, 2017).
45      Cleared US veterans of the Afghanistan campaign may recall the common but bizarre
prevalence of “NATO” documents classified or processed on US systems labeled “Not Releasable
to Foreign Nationals” (NOFORN).
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Best practices from NATO Europe, such as the creation of
the Afghan Mission Network Operations Centre in Kabul, were
implemented in theater. Countries or organizations that had built their
own classified networks, such as the battlefield information collection
and exploitation system [BICES], to NATO standards had interoperable
field-ready systems, demonstrating the potential value of NATO
standards and processes. But ISAF also relied on Afghanistan’s civilian
wireless communications backbone. The relative luxury of confronting
an adversary that was not a significant cyberthreat, however, limits
the application of any technical lessons learned from Afghanistan to
contexts involving advanced cyber and electronic warfare capabilities.

NATO Is Not a Shooter

NATO’s command of the International Security Assistance Force
mission from 2003 to 2014 was the largest and longest running conflict
the Alliance has faced in its 70-year history. That mission continues
today under the more modest Resolute Support Mission to train, advise,
and assist the Afghan government and security institutions. This article
offers a preliminary Alliance-wide assessment of NATO institutions
as well as some initial suppositions that may complement national
initiatives to learn from Afghanistan as well as efforts addressing
future NATO adaptation.46 In terms of strategy and organization,
NATO’s contributions to the international effort in Afghanistan
were procedural rather than substantive. Its structures and processes
facilitated multinational cooperation. But national actions mattered
most. Although NATO’s efforts did not entirely mitigate each nation’s
shortcomings, they were effective.
Perhaps the most significant example of NATO’s value is the fact
that allies remained cohesive and committed in Afghanistan over such
a long period, and in spite of so many political and strategic obstacles.
On an implementation level, NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan both
demonstrated and spurred further development of its field support
services, especially logistics, which enabled many countries to participate
and facilitated cost sharing. Furthermore, the mission in Afghanistan
provided training and experience to the participating national militaries,
promoted their interoperability, and led to the development of several
NATO functions and common standards. The chief implications
of these conclusions are that while national political leadership and
strategy-making remain paramount in war, NATO remains a proven
and effective instrument of organizing and implementing coordinated
multinational efforts.
But will NATO ever attempt something like its Afghanistan mission
again? The answer may be different for the territorial defense of a NATO
46      For an up-to-date summary of challenges facing NATO, see Lute and Burns, NATO at
Seventy. Significant for NATO not only because of the official end of the ISAF mission, 2014
also marked the rise of Islamic State terrorist attacks in Europe, Russia’s annexation of Crimea,
and Russian aggression against Ukraine. These events refocused the attention of NATO allies on
security threats closer to NATO’s traditional geographic area.
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member state than for an expeditionary operation. Today the Alliance
is understandably focused on threats closer to home, and its attention to
future challenges will be increasingly motivated by technological changes
and looming shifts in the global balance of power, such as the rise of
China.47 Variation in the capabilities and the investments of each nation’s
defenses is a contention within the Alliance. Yet nearly every source
consulted or interviewed for this article judged that only two entities
in the world are capable of running a large-scale multinational military
campaign: the United States and NATO. This reality and recent history
strongly suggest NATO will at least be considered when its European or
North American members seek to undertake military action.
The cases of Libya in the Arab Spring, the Global Coalition to Defeat
ISIS, and even current attempts to provide maritime security in Strait of
Hormuz demonstrate this lesson in different ways.48 Many of the basic
questions for evaluating the appropriateness of NATO involvement
are political: does a mission require the participation of non-NATO
countries or entities? If so, do the benefits of NATO’s convening power
and institutional capacities outweigh the costs of adapting NATO to
something new? Does a consensus exist among allies to address the
issue through NATO and to involve the necessary non-NATO partners?
Such questions are reasonable and would need to be addressed and
decided based upon the merits of future cases. In many situations, the best
answer may be no. But reflexive complaints about NATO bureaucracy
or process are less well-founded. Some kind of process or method will
be needed for any multinational activity. If not NATO, then the United
States and other countries would need to establish something that
offers many of the same features. In the likelihood that such a coalition
would be composed substantially of NATO member countries or global
partners, those countries would benefit from the interoperability of
NATO’s common standards. As the counter-ISIS campaign illustrates,
even a well-developed multinational military coalition is unlikely to have
the built-in political consultative mechanisms. And the often overlooked
but essential logistics, communications, and field-support services that
NATO developed and improved in Afghanistan facilitates countries’
participation and cost sharing.
So, if NATO did not exist or was not involved, the United States
and other allies would need to create it or something like it to carry
out the mission. This all argues powerfully for the value of NATO in
Afghanistan as well as future conflicts.

47      Lute and Burns, NATO at Seventy, 35–38.
48       “Statement by the NATO Spokesperson on the Seizure of Two Ships in the Strait of
Hormuz,” NATO, July 20, 2019; Benjamin Mueller, “U.K. Joins U.S.-Led Effort to Protect Ships in
Strait of Hormuz,” New York Times, August 5, 2019; and Jeffrey H. Michaels, “A Model Intervention?
Reflections on NATO’s Libya ‘Success’,” in NATO Beyond 9/11: The Transformation of the Atlantic
Alliance, ed. Ellen Hallams, Luca Ratti, and Ben Zyla (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). See also,
Johnston, How NATO Adapts, 148–51, 166.

